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Abstract

Studies on sanctuary policies and their effects have been a important topic in the political debate about immigration. This study examines the impact of these policies on smaller geographic units, particularly on New York City. Using police-precinct-level data from 2000 to 2010 and a difference-in-differences approach, the study compares the crime rates in precincts with varying concentrations of immigrants before and after the policy's introduction. The results show that sanctuary policies have uneven effects within the city, mainly contributing to lower robbery rates in precincts with high immigrant concentrations. Additionally, an increase in reported sex crimes is observed, likely reflecting changes in reporting behavior. This suggests that sanctuary policies support improved relations between police and immigrants at a more granular level than previously understood.

JEL Classification Code: J15, K37, R59

Keywords: sanctuary cities, undocumented immigrants, spatial heterogeneity

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1 Introduction

In countries hosting immigrants, immigrant-related crime represents a significant political concern. Debates about immigration commonly focus on its impact on national and community safety, often with a concern that immigration policies might worsen crime rates. Contrary to these concerns, most studies in this field indicate that immigration has either a neutral or negative effect on crime rates. (Ousey and Kubrin, 2018).

Sanctuary policies, which provide a sanctuary to undocumented immigrants, are an example of proimmigration policy. It is not ex-ante clear whether these policies affect crime rates. Several studies are examining sanctuary policies and crime (Lyons et al., 2013; Wong, 2017; Martínez-Schuldt and Martínez, 2017; O'Brien et al., 2019; Hausman, 2020; Otsu, 2021; Manning and Burkhardt, 2022). These studies found either no effect or a negative effect on certain types of crime, such as homicide and robbery, with none reporting positive impact on crime rates. Moreover, these papers suggest that the reduction in crime is due to the improved relationship between the police and immigrants.

However, this literature has focused on relatively large geographic units. Specifically, analyses of cities and counties are popular in the literature. Given that sanctuary policies target undocumented immigrants, it is reasonable to assume that their effects are localized and heterogeneous across neighborhoods within a city. Studies must also focus on smaller geographic units to examine the causes of heterogeneity.

This study examines whether the effects of sanctuary policies vary within cities. As sanctuary policies affect immigrants, their effects are likely to be more pronounced in areas with higher concentrations of immigrants. Thus, the main research question is to identify which parts of the city are most affected by the policy.

Accordingly, the sanctuary policy adopted in New York City (NYC) in 2003, which prohibits city officials from questioning or sharing the information about the immigration status. This study focuses on the police-precinct-level data and uses a difference-in-differences approach to compare crime rates in precincts with high concentrations

of immigrants and those with high concentrations of nonimmigrants before and after the introduction of the policy.

The results show that New York's sanctuary policy helps reduce the rate of robberies in precincts with high immigrant concentration. Moreover, the sanctuary policy increases the number of reported sex crimes, possibly due to changes in reporting behavior. These results confirm that immigrant-police relations have improved, with findings similar to those of the city- and county-level analyses at the intra-city level.

This study contributes to the literature on immigration policies, with some advantages over other studies. First, this study examines the impact of sanctuary policies within a city. Although studies on sanctuary policies have emphasized the importance of the community–police relationship, most have evaluated the effect on a city or a county as a whole. Therefore, variation within a city is unclear. This study finds that the effect is found to be heterogeneous in a city, depending on the fraction of immigrants. Second, this study examines the effects of sanctuary policies that restrict inquiry and sharing of information. Although sanctuary policies are common, each city adopts a different type of policy. For example, Kittrie (2006) categorized sanctuary policies into *don't ask*, *don't tell*, and *don't enforce*. However, most studies have ignored the variation in the policies and none has focused on a particular policy at the local jurisdiction level. This study focuses on New York and, according to classification criteria by Kittrie (2006), the sanctuary policy in New York is a combination of the "don't ask" and "don't tell" types. This study identifies the impact of a particular sanctuary policy adopted in New York.

2 Background

2.1 Sanctuary policies do not increase crime rates

There are varied definitions of sanctuary policies. For example, Executive Order 13768 defines it as locales that refuse to comply with federal statute 8 USC 1373 enhancing information related to individuals' immigration statuses with ICE or CBP. The Depart-

ment of Justice defines it as "jurisdiction that may have state laws, local ordinances, or departmental policies limiting the role of local law enforcement agencies and officers in the enforcement of immigration laws."(Office of the Inspector General Audit Division, 2007)

While definitions and specific policies vary across jurisdictions, sanctuary policies are adopted to promote cooperation among residents, which is essential for the efficient operation of law enforcement agencies and the reduction of crime. For example, witnesses have more information about suspects than police immediately after an incident. Without their cooperation, the agencies would have to spend more resources to identify and arrest suspects, leading to lower arrest rates.[1]

Sanctuary policies make undocumented immigrants feel safer in the jurisdiction, which results in better cooperation with city officials, including police officers. With their cooperation, police operations become more efficient in apprehending criminals. Some criminals give up on crime when they expect a higher arrest rate, thus leading to reduced crime rate. Moreover, sanctuary policies increase the chance of employment for undocumented immigrants. Generous immigration policies, which improve access to the labor market and facilitate the application of welfare programs (Alsan and Yang, 2022; East et al., 2018), increase the opportunity cost of crime rises, thereby reducing the crime rate.

However, sanctuary policies are also believed to increase crime rates, mainly because these policies alter the opportunity cost of crime for undocumented immigrants. As generous immigration policies reduce the risk of deportation, undocumented immigrants may have more incentives to commit more crimes.

Moreover, sanctuary policies affect crime rates through sorting across areas. Specifically, sanctuary jurisdictions might attract undocumented immigrants and change the population's composition. When crime rates differ across population groups, crime rates change due to such shifts. For example, the crime rate among undocumented immigrants in Texas is lower than that of natives or legal immigrants (Light et al.,

[1]Cooperation may worsen the observed crime rate as sanctuary policies encourage immigrants to report incidents when they become victims (Amuedo-Dorantes and Deza, 2022).

2020). Therefore, attracting undocumented immigrants could reduce the crime rates in sanctuary jurisdictions.

While the impact of sanctuary policies on crime rates is theoretically unclear, existing empirical studies have found that sanctuary policies do not lead to increase in crime rates, while some actually lead to a decrease (Lyons et al., 2013; Wong, 2017; Martínez-Schuldt and Martínez, 2017; O'Brien et al., 2019; Hausman, 2020; Otsu, 2021; Manning and Burkhardt, 2022). These studies attribute the negative effects to improved police–immigrant relationship. As Otsu (2021) found no evidence of changes in the composition of sanctuary cities following the implementation of the policy, sorting is unlikely to occur at the city level.

2.2 The sanctuary policy in New York

Ed Koch, the Mayor of NYC, adopted a sanctuary policy in 1989. He issued an Executive Order 124,[2] that restricts city officials and employees from sharing information about noncitizens with federal authorities. This policy aims to provide public services such as education and police protection to all city residents, regardless of citizenship and immigration status. By restricting transmission of information, the mayor aimed to ensure that all residents, including undocumented immigrants, could use the public services without fearing immigration authorities. Specifically, Executive Order 124 mandates that no information about noncitizens will be disclosed by city officers unless (1) it is required by law, (2) authorized in writing by the noncitizen, or (3) the noncitizen is suspected of engaging in criminal activity.

However, in 1999, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the second circuit declared the executive order unconstitutional. Subsequently, a new executive order (Executive Order 34) was issued on May 13, 2003. The mayor amended it and issued Executive Order 41[3] in September 2003. The new Executive Order prohibits city officers from inquiring about immigration status unless for a specific purpose. The order also prohibits the

[2] `https://www.nyc.gov/html/records/pdf/executive_orders/1989EO124.PDF`
[3] `https://www1.nyc.gov/assets/immigrants/downloads/pdf/eo-41.pdf`

officers from sharing information about immigration status. The policy is considered a sanctuary policy (National Immigration Law Center, 2008): specifically, it is a combination of the "don't ask" and "don't tell" types (Kittrie, 2006; Otsu, 2021). The policy has a few exceptions, such as the terrorist activity investigation. However, for most undocumented immigrants, it lowers the potential risk of deportation.

3 Data

This study examines the effect within a city and confirms the variation of the effect. Therefore, this study focuses on New York because of its large variations in areas within the city and the availability of detailed crime data before and after the policy. New York became a sanctuary city in 2003; however, the local crime data are available only from 2000. Therefore, this study uses annual crime data in New York from 2000 to 2010 at the police-precinct level. This study also connects the aggregated demographic information from the 2000 census (Manson et al., 2023). The immigration status is based on the foreign-born status, and this study defines immigrants as those born in a foreign country. For the robustness checks, the main regression is performed by the citizenship status in Section 6. The sample includes all police precincts in NYC except the Central Park Police Precinct. Because the Central Park Police Precinct covers only the Central Park area, the demographic information cannot be well defined. The study included 75 police precincts.

Table 1 shows the number of major crimes from 2000 to 2010. On average, 1,825 crimes occur in each precinct every year. Larceny accounts for one-third of all crime counts. Burglary and robbery follow, but rape and murder are rare among the offense categories. To determine geographic variation, Figure 1 plots major offenses per capita in 2000 on a map of New York. The crime rate is the highest in the Midtown South precinct and the lowest in the 123rd precinct on Staten Island. To illustrate geographic variation, Figure 1 plots the total number of major crimes per capita in 2000 on a map of New York. The crime rate is highest in the Midtown South precinct and lowest in

the 123rd Precinct on Staten Island.

Table 2 summarizes the demographic summary. The population varies from 16,179 to 242,951, with a mean of 106,778. The fraction of immigrants in each precinct also varies by precinct, and it spans from 11% to about 70%. On average, immigrants account for about 33% of the population in each police precinct. Figure 2 shows the fraction of immigrants on the map of NYC. The figure shows that police precincts in Queens have a higher percentage of immigrants and that in Staten Island have a lower percentage.

4 Approach

A difference-in-difference (DID) approach is used to confirm the heterogeneity of the effect of the sanctuary policy. For each police precinct, an indicator, $HighForeignBorn_i$, is defined. This is set to one if the fraction of the foreign-born population in Precinct i at 2000 exceeds the mean of the entire NYC. The log of crime rates in precinct i at year t is regressed using the following equation:

$$\log y_{it} = \alpha_s Sanctuary_t + HighForeignBorn_i \times Sanctuary_t + \eta_i + \eta_t + \theta_i \times t + \epsilon_{it}. \quad (1)$$

$Sanctuary_t$ is a binary indicator of the sanctuary status of precinct i in year t. As the sanctuary policy applies to all police precincts, $Sanctuary_{it} = Sanctuary_t$ for all i. The terms η_i and η_t are precinct- and year-fixed effects. The term θ_i captures a linear time trend for precinct i. As the sanctuary status depends on the year alone, one of the year-fixed effects is omitted for the regression. Note that α_s captures the mean difference of the outcome variable before and after the policy adoption. The mean difference includes both the effects of the sanctuary policy on the entire city and part of time trends.

Additionally, to find the accurate difference among precincts, the quintiles of the fraction of foreigners in each precinct (Q_k) are constructed. Similar to (1), the following

model is estimated:

$$\log y_{it} = \alpha_s Sanctuary_t + \sum_{k=2}^{5} \alpha_k \times Sanctuary_t \times Q_k + \eta_i + \eta_t + \theta_i \times t + \epsilon_{it}. \quad (2)$$

As $Sanctuary_t$ interacts with the quintile dummy Q_k, the coefficient α_k captures the differential effect of the sanctuary policy on immigrant-concentrated areas relative to the area with the least foreign-born populations (Q_1).[4]

5 Results

5.1 Major offenses

Tables 3 and 4 present the results of the regression analysis for major offenses. The estimation results in Table 3 show the sanctuary policy decreases robbery. The precincts with a higher fraction of immigrants experience about a 7% lower robbery rate. However, no significant change is found for other crimes. Although most of the point estimators are negative, the regressions on larceny and rape have positive coefficients.

Moreover, Table 4 divides the effects by quintile classes and summarizes the effects relative to quintile 1. Some coefficients of the interaction terms show a negative effect. Additionally, robbery, assault, and total crime rates are lower in immigrant-concentrated areas. For example, compared with the first quintile, the fifth quintile has 14.8, 12.3, 7.6% lower rates of assault, robbery, and total major offenses, respectively.

On the contrary, the rape rate is higher for precincts with a higher fraction of immigrants, and, for example, the fifth quintile has a 34.7% higher rate of rape.

As all crimes are reported crime counts, the higher rate of rape might reflect the change in reporting behavior. (Amuedo-Dorantes and Arenas-Arroyo, 2021; Jácome, 2022)

[4]Figure 3 shows the quintile classifications on the map, and Figure 4 shows the crime trends by quintiles. All types of crime have a downward trend over the period.

5.2 Nonmajor offenses

Tables 5 is the same estimation for nonmajor offenses. The coefficients for the interaction terms in Table 5 have almost insignificant effects. Although in the literature the association between immigrants and drug crime is mixed (Adelman et al., 2021), the coefficient on felony drug usage indicates that felony drug increases more in foreign-born concentrated areas. However, the felony drug rate increased by 75% after the sanctuary policy was adopted. Thus, while there appears to be geographic heterogeneity in the effect, the citywide increase would be more significant for this type of crime.

The overall felony sex rate decreases after adopting the sanctuary policy, but increases on Q5. This could be attributed to increased reporting, as evidenced by the increase in rape rate.

In summary, the sanctuary policy appears to have a heterogeneous effect on felony drug and felony sex rates but does not have any heterogeneous effect on other minor offenses.

6 Robustness checks and discussion

For robustness checks, Table 6 shows the results of the regressions weighted by the population. The results are similar to that in Table 4; however, the magnitude of the effect is pronounced for rape and robbery. For example, the fifth quintile has 41.1% higher and 14.9% lower rates of rape and robbery, respectively.

To check the robustness of the results, the following regression is run based on the proportion of noncitizen population.

$$\log y_{it} = \alpha_s Sanctuary_t + HighNonCitizen_i \times Sanctuary_t + \eta_i + \eta_t + \theta_i \times t + \epsilon_{it}. \quad (3)$$

There is a high correlation between *HighForeignBorn* and *HighNonCitizen*, and in most precincts, both are zero or one. Only five precincts (47, 69, 75, 105, 111) have

one for *HighForeignBorn* but zero for *HighNonCitizen*. Hence, the differences in the results are mainly driven by the five precincts.

The results are summarized in Table 7 and 8. Unlike the main regression, varying proportions of noncitizens do not result in heterogeneous effects of the sanctuary policies. In addition to the statistical interpretation, the coefficients indicate that the economic impacts are less significant than those in the case of foreign-born categorization. Table 8 divides the effects by quintile classes. While the results largely mirror the case of foreign-born categorization in terms of statistical significance, the additional impacts of the sanctuary policy relative to $Q1$ become smaller in magnitude. In summary, the results in Table 7 and 8 indicate that the foreign-born status is more important than the actual citizenship.[5]

The main results confirm the heterogeneity of policy effects based on foreign-born categories, with the negative effect is being specific to certain crimes such as robbery. Moreover, the increase in rape rates is likely due to increased reporting. These results lend support to improved police–community relations changing crime rates. Hence, the analysis of smaller geographic units provides additional evidence. However, the analysis of smaller units does not help to identify the source of the policy effect.

This study faces a limitation related to the parallel trend assumption, because the dataset begins three years before the policy was adopted. While there are no obvious differences in the trends between groups for at least these three years, the data are insufficient to draw conclusions about that assumption. Even if data from earlier years were available, excluding the possibility that the trends were altered by the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks would be a challenge. Hence, this study cannot exclude the possibility that the estimators are affected by the time trends.

[5]The weighted regression results are in Table 9 and the results are similar to Table 8 both qualitatively and quantitatively.

7 Conclusion

This study focuses on smaller geographic units to confirm the spatially heterogeneous impact of sanctuary policies. Specifically, it uses the police-precinct-level data in NYC from 2000 to 2010. Using a difference-in-differences approach, the crime rates in precincts with high concentrations of foreign-born population are compared with those in low concentration areas before and after the policy was introduced.

The results show that the sanctuary policy introduced in 2002 in New York reduced the rates of robbery in precincts with high immigrant concentration. Given that the policy targets immigrants, the reduced rates of robbery supports the improved police–immigrant relationship and confirms the macro-level findings in the literature within a city. Moreover, the increase in the rape rate indicates the change in reporting behavior resulting from the sanctuary policy.

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Table 1: Summary statistics (2000–2010: Crime counts by precinct)

$N = 825$	Mean	S.D.	Min	Max
Burglary	346.9	183.3	51	1,086
Assault	255.5	162.2	25	1,061
Larceny	603.7	541.5	77	4,870
Auto theft	262.5	202.3	15	1,223
Murder	7.6	6.8	0	40
Rape	22.7	16.0	0	106
Robbery	325.8	169.4	22	1,169
Total (Major crime)	1,824.6	847.9	330	6,857

Table 2: Demographics by Precinct (2000)

$N = 75$	Mean	S.D.	Min	Max
Population	106,778	50,274	16,179	242,951
% Hispanic	27.3	20.6	4.6	75.9
% White (NonHispanic)	34.3	28.0	0.7	88.2
% Black (NonHispanic)	25.9	26.3	0.4	90.4
% Foreign-born	32.9	13.7	11.4	67.8
% Noncitizen	18.6	8.6	3.3	46.4
% Noncitizen (Born in Central&South America)	7.8	6.6	0.4	30.0

Table 3: Precinct-level analysis in New York: 2000–2010 (Binary)

VARIABLES	(1) Burglary	(2) Assault	(3) Larceny	(4) Auto Theft	(5) Murder	(6) Rape	(7) Robbery	(8) Total
Sanctuary	-0.263***	-0.364***	0.512***	-1.533***	-0.165***	0.197***	-0.193***	-0.349***
	(0.0161)	(0.0181)	(0.0183)	(0.0175)	(0.0594)	(0.0358)	(0.0152)	(0.0108)
Sanctuary × HighForeignBorn	-0.0122	-0.0323	0.0448	-0.0136	-0.0451	0.0925	-0.0723**	-0.0253
	(0.0451)	(0.0378)	(0.0385)	(0.0364)	(0.144)	(0.0957)	(0.0333)	(0.0246)
Observations	825	825	825	825	781	824	825	825
Number of PCT	75	75	75	75	75	75	75	75
Year&PCT FE	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Trend	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Weighted	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N

Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Note: The outcome variable is the log of annual crime rates from 2001 to 2005. No control is used. The data on crime are from the NYC Police Department. Standard errors are clustered at the precinct level.

Table 4: Precinct-level analysis in New York: 2000–2010

VARIABLES	(1) Burglary	(2) Assault	(3) Larceny	(4) Auto Theft	(5) Murder	(6) Rape	(7) Robbery	(8) Total
Sanctuary	-0.275***	-0.381***	0.500***	-1.535***	-0.162**	0.232***	-0.206***	-0.359***
	(0.0183)	(0.0210)	(0.0201)	(0.0197)	(0.0655)	(0.0445)	(0.0178)	(0.0114)
Sanctuary × Q2	-0.0352	-0.0952*	-0.0417	0.0442	0.131	0.285*	-0.0629	-0.0220
	(0.0617)	(0.0571)	(0.0585)	(0.0397)	(0.254)	(0.144)	(0.0451)	(0.0389)
Sanctuary × Q3	-0.123	-0.113*	-0.0840	-0.0588	-0.0553	0.109	-0.116**	-0.114***
	(0.0750)	(0.0610)	(0.0505)	(0.0626)	(0.210)	(0.135)	(0.0533)	(0.0341)
Sanctuary × Q4	-0.0837	-0.0464	0.0898	-0.00766	-0.0598	0.191	-0.106**	-0.0322
	(0.0653)	(0.0499)	(0.0599)	(0.0500)	(0.253)	(0.142)	(0.0478)	(0.0283)
Sanctuary × Q5	-0.0168	-0.148**	-0.0820	-0.0314	-0.0603	0.347**	-0.123**	-0.0761**
	(0.0751)	(0.0595)	(0.0538)	(0.0542)	(0.218)	(0.172)	(0.0541)	(0.0371)
Observations	825	825	825	825	781	824	825	825
Number of PCT	75	75	75	75	75	75	75	75
Year&PCT FE	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Trend	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Weighted	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N

Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Note: The outcome variable is the log of annual crime rates from 2001 to 2005. No control is used. The data on crime are from the NYC Police Department. Standard errors are clustered at the precinct level.

Table 5: Precinct-level analysis in New York: 2000–2010 (Nonmajor offenses)

VARIABLES	(1) Arson	(2) Mischief	(3) Fel. Drugs	(4) Fel. Weapons	(5) Fel. Possess.	(6) Fel. Sex	(7) Forgery	(8) Other Fel.
Sanctuary	-0.755***	-0.596***	0.754***	1.390***	-0.319**	-0.230***	2.011***	-0.424***
	(0.0461)	(0.0467)	(0.0400)	(0.0532)	(0.131)	(0.0499)	(0.0422)	(0.0254)
Sanctuary × Q2	0.0168	-0.107	0.0372	-0.0141	0.250	0.234	-0.0629	0.0157
	(0.132)	(0.139)	(0.116)	(0.185)	(0.248)	(0.169)	(0.135)	(0.0903)
Sanctuary × Q3	-0.112	-0.220	0.0487	-0.250	0.0312	0.0937	-0.260	-0.195**
	(0.163)	(0.166)	(0.133)	(0.173)	(0.200)	(0.139)	(0.165)	(0.0862)
Sanctuary × Q4	-0.0519	-0.130	0.331*	-0.171	0.193	0.144	-0.126	0.0159
	(0.135)	(0.126)	(0.179)	(0.202)	(0.214)	(0.162)	(0.125)	(0.0778)
Sanctuary × Q5	-0.0857	-0.117	0.284**	0.0364	-0.0898	0.304*	-0.0646	-0.00134
	(0.179)	(0.113)	(0.125)	(0.210)	(0.238)	(0.168)	(0.143)	(0.0663)
Observations	822	825	825	824	821	823	825	825
Number of PCT	75	75	75	75	75	75	75	75
Year&PCT FE	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Trend	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y

Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Note: The outcome variable is the log of annual crime rates from 2001 to 2010. No control is used. The data on crime are from the NYC Police Department. Standard errors are clustered at the precinct level.

Table 6: Precinct-level analysis in New York: 2000–2010 (Weighted)

VARIABLES	(1) Burglary	(2) Assault	(3) Larceny	(4) Auto Theft	(5) Murder	(6) Rape	(7) Robbery	(8) Total
Sanctuary	-0.266***	-0.374***	0.515***	-1.545***	-0.185***	0.228***	-0.214***	-0.354***
	(0.0192)	(0.0212)	(0.0212)	(0.0172)	(0.0641)	(0.0410)	(0.0225)	(0.0121)
Sanctuary × Q2	-0.0332	-0.108**	-0.0448	0.0399	0.155	0.270**	-0.0898	-0.0331
	(0.0563)	(0.0487)	(0.0555)	(0.0326)	(0.245)	(0.127)	(0.0684)	(0.0343)
Sanctuary × Q3	-0.102	-0.127**	-0.0602	-0.0447	-0.0206	0.148	-0.167**	-0.112***
	(0.0640)	(0.0570)	(0.0558)	(0.0590)	(0.234)	(0.126)	(0.0649)	(0.0331)
Sanctuary × Q4	-0.0898	-0.0560	0.109*	-0.0223	-0.116	0.292**	-0.158***	-0.0402
	(0.0606)	(0.0480)	(0.0596)	(0.0497)	(0.281)	(0.127)	(0.0581)	(0.0291)
Sanctuary × Q5	-0.0290	-0.141**	-0.0610	-0.0536	-0.0389	0.411***	-0.149**	-0.0777**
	(0.0907)	(0.0589)	(0.0585)	(0.0429)	(0.238)	(0.143)	(0.0646)	(0.0388)
Observations	825	825	825	825	781	824	825	825
Number of PCT	75	75	75	75	75	75	75	75
Year&PCT FE	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Trend	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Weighted	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y

Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Note: The outcome variable is the log of annual crime rates from 2001 to 2005. No control is used. The data on crime are from the NYC Police Department. Regression is weighted by population and standard errors are clustered at the precinct level.

Table 7: Precinct-level analysis in New York: 2000–2010 (Noncitizen-binary)

VARIABLES	(1) Burglary	(2) Assault	(3) Larceny	(4) Auto Theft	(5) Murder	(6) Rape	(7) Robbery	(8) Total
Sanctuary	-0.260***	-0.365***	0.507***	-1.529***	-0.157**	0.201***	-0.189***	-0.347***
	(0.0158)	(0.0177)	(0.0180)	(0.0175)	(0.0598)	(0.0359)	(0.0151)	(0.0107)
Sanctuary × HighNonCitizen	0.0117	-0.0488	0.0100	0.0238	0.0567	0.147	-0.0425	-0.0107
	(0.0460)	(0.0378)	(0.0396)	(0.0367)	(0.146)	(0.0973)	(0.0341)	(0.0249)
Observations	825	825	825	825	781	824	825	825
Number of PCT	75	75	75	75	75	75	75	75
Year&PCT FE	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Trend	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Weighted	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N

Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Note: The outcome variable is the log of annual crime rates from 2001 to 2005. No control is used. The data on crime are from the NYC Police Department. Standard errors are clustered at the precinct level. Threshold is $s_{Citizen} > 83.62$

Table 8: Precinct-level analysis in New York: 2000–2010 (Noncitizen)

VARIABLES	(1) Burglary	(2) Assault	(3) Larceny	(4) Auto Theft	(5) Murder	(6) Rape	(7) Robbery	(8) Total
Sanctuary	-0.252***	-0.377***	0.507***	-1.536***	-0.150**	0.234***	-0.204***	-0.351***
	(0.0166)	(0.0217)	(0.0200)	(0.0176)	(0.0635)	(0.0461)	(0.0180)	(0.0116)
Sanctuary × Q2	0.101	0.00705	0.0440	-0.0324	0.212	0.157	-0.0409	0.0309
	(0.0641)	(0.0541)	(0.0588)	(0.0529)	(0.237)	(0.149)	(0.0470)	(0.0400)
Sanctuary × Q3	-0.0155	-0.141**	-0.0427	-0.0479	-0.106	0.240*	-0.122**	-0.0748**
	(0.0606)	(0.0610)	(0.0607)	(0.0518)	(0.224)	(0.141)	(0.0560)	(0.0337)
Sanctuary × Q4	0.0329	-0.0680	0.0452	0.0250	0.235	0.244	-0.0770	-0.00648
	(0.0526)	(0.0557)	(0.0566)	(0.0509)	(0.244)	(0.184)	(0.0531)	(0.0351)
Sanctuary × Q5	0.0477	-0.119**	-0.0243	-0.0309	-0.0495	0.316**	-0.117**	-0.0441
	(0.0589)	(0.0594)	(0.0641)	(0.0456)	(0.199)	(0.122)	(0.0494)	(0.0336)
Observations	825	825	825	825	781	824	825	825
Number of PCT	75	75	75	75	75	75	75	75
Year&PCT FE	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Trend	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Weighted	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N

Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Note: The outcome variable is the log of annual crime rates from 2001 to 2005. No control is used. The data on crime are from the NYC Police Department. Standard errors are clustered at the precinct level.

Table 9: Precinct-level analysis in New York: 2000–2010 (Weighted: Noncitizen)

VARIABLES	(1) Burglary	(2) Assault	(3) Larceny	(4) Auto Theft	(5) Murder	(6) Rape	(7) Robbery	(8) Total
Sanctuary	-0.249***	-0.370***	0.523***	-1.544***	-0.177***	0.223***	-0.210***	-0.346***
	(0.0184)	(0.0210)	(0.0206)	(0.0159)	(0.0634)	(0.0425)	(0.0227)	(0.0122)
Sanctuary × Q2	0.0509	-0.0288	0.0306	-0.0367	0.154	0.122	-0.0597	0.00750
	(0.0574)	(0.0505)	(0.0556)	(0.0515)	(0.237)	(0.127)	(0.0692)	(0.0353)
Sanctuary × Q3	-0.0273	-0.127**	0.00539	-0.0478	-0.164	0.237*	-0.181***	-0.0825***
	(0.0564)	(0.0572)	(0.0714)	(0.0559)	(0.219)	(0.135)	(0.0677)	(0.0297)
Sanctuary × Q4	0.0210	-0.0818	0.0605	0.0246	0.162	0.275*	-0.122*	-0.0157
	(0.0541)	(0.0532)	(0.0598)	(0.0469)	(0.277)	(0.163)	(0.0639)	(0.0367)
Sanctuary × Q5	0.000308	-0.119**	-0.00758	-0.0457	-0.0192	0.374***	-0.136**	-0.0500
	(0.0828)	(0.0558)	(0.0637)	(0.0369)	(0.217)	(0.105)	(0.0629)	(0.0357)
Observations	825	825	825	825	781	824	825	825
Number of PCT	75	75	75	75	75	75	75	75
Year&PCT FE	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Trend	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Weighted	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y

Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Note: The outcome variable is the log of annual crime rates from 2001 to 2005. No control is used. The data on crime are from the NYC Police Department. Regression is weighted by population and standard errors are clustered at the precinct level.



Figure 1: Total crime per 100,000 population in 2000



(a) Fraction of foreign-born population



(b) Fraction of noncitizen population

Figure 2: Demographic composition



(a) Quintiles by % foreign-born population



(b) Quintiles by % noncitizen population

Figure 3: Quintiles by demographic composition



(a) Major crimes



(b) Nonmajor crimes

Figure 4: Crime trends by fraction of foreign-born individuals